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Abstract
Role-based trust management languages deﬁne a formalism, which uses credentials to handle trust
in decentralized, distributed access control systems. A credential provides information about the
privileges of users and the security policies issued by one or more trusted authorities. The main
topic of this paper is RTT, a language which supports manifold roles and role-product operators to
express threshold and separation of duties policies. The core part of the paper deﬁnes a relational,
set-theoretic semantics for the language, and introduces a deductive system, in which credentials
can be derived from an initial set of credentials using a set of inference rules. The soundness and
the completeness of the deductive system with respect to the semantics of RTT is proved.
1. Introduction
The problem of guaranteeing that conﬁdential
data and services oﬀered by a computer system
are not made available to unauthorized users
is a challenging issue, which must be solved by
reliable software technologies that are used for
building high-integrity applications. The tradi-
tional solution to this problem is an implementa-
tion of some access control techniques, by which
users are identiﬁed, and granted or denied access
to a system data and other resources, depend-
ing on their individual or group identity. The
examples of such solutions can be Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) facilities, Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) and Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) systems. Such an approach ﬁts
well into closed and centralized environments, in
which the identity of users is known in advance.
Quite new challenges arise in decentralized
and open systems, where the identity of users is
not known in advance and the set of users can
change. For example, consider a university, in
which the students are enrolled and registered
in particular faculties, and no central registry
of all the students of that university exists. The
policy of the university is such that a student
is eligible to attend a lecture given by a faculty,
regardless of the faculty in which he or she is ac-
tually registered. However, how could a faculty
(the lecture owner) know that Peter Pan is eligi-
ble to attend the lecture, if his name is unknown
to this faculty? The identity of the student it-
self does not help in making a decision whether
he or she is eligible to attend or not. What is
needed to make such a decision is information
about the privileges assigned to Peter Pan by
other authorities (is he registered in a faculty),
as well as trust information about the authority
itself (is the faculty a part of this university).
Trust-management system is a standardized
solution for controlling security-critical services
in high-integrity applications (Figure 1). It helps
answer questions related to the conformance
of potentially dangerous operations to a secu-
rity policy of an organization, and provides the
users with a language for writing the policies
and controlling access to system services and10 Anna Felkner, Krzysztof Sacha
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Figure 1. Trust management system
resources. The policies are no longer hard-coded
into applications and therefore can be much eas-
ier to change. A designer of an application must
only identify the security issues in the applica-
tion and formulate appropriate queries to the
trust-management system.
Such a conception of trust management, in-
troduced in [2], has evolved since that time to
a much broader context of assessing the reliabil-
ity and developing trustworthiness for other sys-
tems and individuals [9]. In this paper, however,
we will use the term trust management only in a
meaning restricted to the ﬁeld of access control.
The paper is organized as follows. An
overview of the work related to role-based trust
management systems and languages is given in
Section 2. Section 4 describes the relational se-
mantics of RTT language. Section 6, which is the
core part of our contribution, presents a deduc-
tive system, in which credentials can be derived
from an initial set of credentials using a set of
inference rules. A proof of the soundness and
the completeness of the deductive system with
respect to the semantics of RTT is presented as
well. Sections 3 and 5 provide the reader with
illustrative examples. Final remarks and plans
for future research are given in conclusions.
2. Related Work
Traditional access control systems usually rely
on Role-Based Access Control model [14, 6, 7],
which groups the access rights by the role name
and limits the access to a resource to those users,
who are assigned to a particular role. RBAC sys-
tems provide authorization decisions based on
the identity of the users, and work well in cen-
tralized environment of an enterprise.
Trust management model represents quite
another approach to access control, in which
decisions are based on credentials (certiﬁcates)
issued by multiple principals. A credential is
an attestation of qualiﬁcation, competence or
authority, issued to an individual by a third
party. Examples of credentials in real life in-
clude identiﬁcation documents, social security
cards, driver’s licenses, membership cards, aca-
demic diplomas, certiﬁcations, security clear-
ances, passwords and user names, keys, etc.
A credential in a computer system can be a dig-
itally signed document.
The potential and ﬂexibility of trust man-
agement approach stems from the possibility of
delegation: A principal may transfer limited au-
thority over a resource to other principals. Such
a delegation can be implemented by means of an
appropriate credential. This way, a set of cre-
dentials can deﬁne the access control strategy
and allow of deciding on who is authorized to
access a resource, and who is not. A side-eﬀect
of delegation is such that a number of authoriz-
ing principals can be distributed over a network.
A variety of problems arises if the credentials are
stored in a decentralized manner.
The term trust management was ﬁrst ap-
plied in the context of distributed access con-
trol in [2]. The ﬁrst trust management system
described in the literature was PolicyMaker [3],
which deﬁned a special assertion language capa-
ble of expressing policy statements, which were
locally trusted, and credentials, which had to be
signed using a private key. The next generation
of trust management languages were KeyNote
[1], which was an enhanced version of Policy-
Maker, SPKI/SDSI [4] and a few other lan-
guages. All those languages allowed assigning
privileges to entities and used credentials to del-
egate permissions from its issuer to its subject.
What was missing in those languages was the
possibility of delegation based on attributes of
the entities and not on their identity.Deriving RT
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Role-Based Trust management (RT) lan-
guages use roles to represent attributes [12]. The
meaning of a role is a set of entities who have the
attribute represented by the role. This meaning
of roles captures the notion of groups of users
in many systems and has been borrowed from
Role-Based Access Control approach. The core
language of RT family is RT0, described in detail
in [13]. It allows describing localized authorities
for roles, role hierarchies, delegation of authority
over roles and role intersections. All the subse-
quent languages add new features to RT0.
RT1 introduces parametrized roles, i.e. roles
that are described using additional parameters,
which can represent relationships between en-
tities. RT2 adds to RT1 logical objects, which
can represent permissions given to entities with
respect to groups of logically related objects (re-
sources). Those extensions can help in keeping
the notation concise, but does not increase the
expressive power of the language, because each
combination of parameters in RT1 and each per-
mission to a logical object in RT2 can be deﬁned
alternatively as a separate role in RT0.
RTT provides manifold roles and role-prod-
uct operators, which can express threshold and
separation of duties policies. A manifold role is
a role that can be satisﬁed by a set of cooper-
ating entities. A singleton role can be treated
as a special case of a manifold role, whose set
of cooperating entities is a singleton set. This
way, RT0 credentials can also be expressed in
RTT. A threshold policy requires a speciﬁed
minimum number of entities to agree on some
fact, e.g. in a requirement that two diﬀerent
bank cashiers must authorize a transaction. Sep-
aration of duties policy requires a set of enti-
ties, each of which fulﬁls a speciﬁc role, to agree
before access is granted. Both types of policies
mean that some transactions cannot be com-
pleted by a single entity, because no single entity
has all the access rights required to complete
the transaction.
RTD provides mechanisms to describe del-
egation of role activations and selective use of
role membership. This language is not covered
in this paper. The features of RTT and RTD
can be combined together with the features of
RT0, RT1 or RT2. A more detailed treatment
of the Role-Based Trust management family of
languages can be found in [12].
2.1. The Language RT0
Basic elements of all the RT languages are en-
tities, role names, roles and credentials. Enti-
ties represent principals that can deﬁne roles
and issue credentials, and requesters that can
make requests to access resources. An entity can
be identiﬁed by a user account in a computer
system or by a public key. Role names repre-
sent permissions that can be issued by entities
to other entities or groups of entities. Roles rep-
resent sets of entities that have permissions is-
sued by particular issuers. A role is deﬁned as
a pair composed of an entity (role issuer) and
a role name. Credentials deﬁne roles by point-
ing a new member of the role or by delegating
authority to the members of other roles.
In this paper, we use nouns beginning with a
capital letter or just capital letters, e.g. A;B;C,
to denote entities and sets of entities. Role
names are denoted as identiﬁers beginning with
a small letter or just small letters, e.g. r;s;t.
Roles take the form of an entity (the issuer of
this role) followed by a role name separated by
a dot, e.g. A:r. Credentials are statements in
the language. A credential consists of a role, left
arrow symbol and a role expression.
There are four types of credentials in RT0,
which should be interpreted in the following way:
A:r   B – simple membership: Entity B is a
member of role A:r.
A:r   B:s – simple inclusion: Role A:r includes
(all members of) role B:s. This is a delega-
tion of authority over r from A to B, be-
cause B may cause new entities to become
members of the role A:r by issuing creden-
tials that deﬁne B:s.
A:r   B:s:t – linking inclusion: Role A:r in-
cludes role C:t for each C, which is a member
of role B:s. This is a delegation of authority
from A to all the members of the role B:s.
The expression B:s:t is called a linked role.
A:r   B:s \ C:t – intersection inclusion: Role
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of both roles B:s and C:t. This is a partial
delegation from A to B and C. The expres-
sion B:s \ C:t is called an intersection role.
A formal, set-theoretic semantics of RT0 has
been deﬁned in a slightly diﬀerent manner in [13]
and [8].
Let E be a set of entities, R a set of role
names and P a set of RT0 credentials. The se-
mantics of the set P of RT0 credentials is a func-
tion SP:
SP : E  R ! 2E:
such that SP is the least ﬁxpoint of the following
sequence of functions Ri, which map roles to sets
of entity names [8]:
1. R0 maps each role to an empty set 
2. Ri+1 =
L
c2P f(Ri;c)
where
L
is the point-wise extension of a func-
tion and f is a function that, given a (partial)
semantics Ri and a credential A:r   e, returns
all the entities that should be added to Ri(A:r),
as governed by e:
f(Ri;A:r   B) = fA:r 7! fBgg
f(Ri;A:r   B:s) = fA:r 7! Ri(B:s)g
f(Ri;A:r   B:s:t) = fA:r 7!
[
C2Ri(B:s)
Ri(C:t)g
f(Ri;A:r   B:s \ C:t)
= fA:r 7! Ri(B:s) \ Ri(C:t)g
2.2. The Language RTT
At the syntax level, RTT adopts all the four
types of RT0 credentials, and adds two new
types of credentials. These are:
A:r   B:s  C:t – role A:r includes one mem-
ber of role B:s and one member of role C:t.
This allows expressing threshold policies.
A:r   B:s 
 C:t – role A:r includes one mem-
ber of role B:s and one member of role C:t,
but those members of roles have to be diﬀer-
ent. This allows for expressing separation of
duties policies.
The changes at the semantics level are
greater, because the requesters as well as the
issuers of RTT credentials are no longer enti-
ties, but sets of entities, who can jointly fulﬁl
a role. Such a change applies to all six types of
credentials, also those, which are adopted from
RT0.
Formal deﬁnition of the semantics of RTT is
covered in Section 4.
3. Examples
The models discussed in this paper can be, in
general, very complex. Therefore, we present
here only simpliﬁed examples, with the intention
to illustrate the basic notions and the notation.
The ﬁrst example demonstrates the use of RT0
credentials, while the second one presents the
use of RTT credentials.
Example 1 (RT0)
A person has the right to attend a lecture, given
at a university U, when he or she is a student
registered to a faculty of this university. To be
able to fulﬁl the role of a faculty, an organi-
zation ought to be a division of the university
and should conduct research activities. John is
a student registered to F, which is a division of
U, and which conducts research activities. The
following credentials prove that John have the
right to attend a lecture:
U:lecture   U:faculty:student (1)
U:faculty   U:division \ U:research (2)
U:division   F (3)
U:research   F (4)
F:student   John (5)
Example 2 (RTT)
The following example has been adopted from
[11]. A bank B has three roles: manager,
cashier and auditor. Security policy of the
bank requires an approval of certain transac-
tions from a manager, two cashiers, and an
auditor. The two cashiers must be diﬀerent.
However, a manager who is also a cashier can
serve as one of the two cashiers. The auditor
must be diﬀerent from the other parties in the
transaction.Deriving RT
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Such a policy can be described using the fol-
lowing credentials:
B:twoCashiers   B:cashier 
 B:cashier (6)
B:managerCashiers
  B:manager  B:twoCashiers (7)
B:approval
  B:auditor 
 B:managerCashiers (8)
Now, assume that the following credentials
have been added:
B:cashier   Mary (9)
B:cashier   Doris (10)
B:cashier   Alice (11)
B:cashier   Kate (12)
B:manager   Alice (13)
B:auditor   Kate (14)
Then one can conclude that, according to the
policy of B, the following sets of entities can
cooperatively approve a transaction: fMary,
Doris, Alice, Kateg, fMary, Alice, Kateg and
fDoris, Alice, Kateg.
4. The Semantics of RT T
The syntax of a language deﬁnes language ex-
pressions, which are used to communicate infor-
mation. The primary expressions of Role-Based
Trust management languages are credentials
and sets of credentials, which are used as a
means for deﬁning roles.
The semantics of a language deﬁnes the
meaning of expressions. Such a deﬁnition con-
sists of two parts [10]: A semantic domain and a
semantic mapping from the syntax to the seman-
tic domain. The meaning of a language expres-
sion must be an element in the semantic domain.
The semantics of RT0, which deﬁnes the
meaning of a set of credentials as a function
from the set of roles into the power set of en-
tities, has no potential to describe the mean-
ing of RTT, which supports manifold roles and
role-product operators. Therefore, we deﬁne in
this section the meaning of a set of credentials
as a relation over the set of roles and the power
set of entities. Thus, we use a Cartesian product
of the set of roles and the power set of entities
as the semantic domain of a Role-Based Trust
management language. The semantic mapping
would associate a speciﬁc relation between roles
and entities with each set of credentials. Such a
relational approach allows us to deﬁne a formal
semantics of RTT language [5].
Let E be the set of entities and R be the
set of role names. P is a set of RT-credentials,
which describe the assignment of sets of entities
to roles, issued by other entities (or rather sets
of entities).
The semantics of P, denoted by SP, is de-
ﬁned as a relation:
SP  2E  R  2E;
An instance of this relation, e.g.: (A;r;X),
maps the role A:r to a set of entities X 2 2E.
If the cardinality of set X is greater than one,
then the role A:r is a manifold role and the en-
tities of set X must cooperate together in order
to satisfy the role. The cardinality of set A can
also be greater than one, which would mean that
the role A:r is governed jointly by the entities of
set A.
If all the sets of entities are singleton sets,
the semantics of RTT reduces to the semantics
of RT0. This way, our deﬁnition covers all the
RT languages including RT0 through RTT.
Denote the power set of entities by F = 2E.
Each element in F is a set of entities from E
(a subset of E). Each element in 2F is a set,
compound of sets of entities from E.
The semantics of P can now be described in
an alternative way as a function:
e SP : 2E  R ! 2F
which maps each role from 2E  R into a set of
subsets of entities. The members of each subset
must cooperate in order to satisfy the role.
Knowing the relation SP, one can deﬁne the
function e SP as follows:
e SP(A;r) = fX 2 2E : (A;r;X) 2 SPg
The semantics of RTT can now be deﬁned
formally in the following way.14 Anna Felkner, Krzysztof Sacha
Deﬁnition 1. The semantics of a set P of RTT credentials, denoted by SP, is the smallest relation
Si, such that:
1. S0 = 
2. Si+1 =
S
c2P f(Si;c) for i = 0;1;:::
which is closed with respect to function f, which describes the meaning of credentials in the following
way (A;B;C;X;Y are sets of entities, may be singletons):
f(Si;A:r   X) = f(A;r;X)g (D1)
f(Si;A:r   B:s) = f(A;r;X) : (B;s;X) 2 Sig (D2)
f(Si;A:r   B:s:t) =
S
C:(B;s;C)2Sif(A;r;X) : (C;t;X) 2 Sig (D3)
f(Si;A:r   B:s \ C:t) = f(A;r;X) : (B;s;X) 2 Si ^ (C;t;X) 2 Sig (D4)
f(Si;A:r   B:s  C:t) = f(A;r;X [ Y ) : (B;s;X) 2 Si ^ (C;t;Y ) 2 Sig (D5)
f(Si;A:r   B:s 
 C:t) = f(A;r;X [ Y ) : (B;s;X) 2 Si ^ (C;t;Y ) 2 Si ^(X \ Y ) = g (D6)
5. Examples
We use the example sets of credentials from Section 3 to illustrate the deﬁnition of RTT semantics.
Example 1 (RT0)
The starting relation S0 is, by deﬁnition, empty. The sequence of steps to compute consecutive
relations Si can be described as follows:
S0 = 
S1 = f(fUg;division;fFg); (fUg;research;fFg); (fFg;student;fJohng)g
S2 = f(fUg;division;fFg); (fUg;research;fFg); (fFg;student;fJohng);
(fUg;faculty;fFg)g
S3 = f(fUg;division;fFg); (fUg;research;fFg); (fFg;student;fJohng);
(fUg;faculty;fFg); (fUg;lecture;fJohng)g
The resulting relation S3 cannot be changed using the given set of credentials, hence: SP = S3.
Because the RT language considered in this example is RT0, all the sets of entities are singleton
sets.
Example 2 (RTT)
The sequence of steps to compute consecutive relations Si starts from an empty set, S0 = , and
proceeds as follows. Credentials 9 through 14 are mapped in S0 into relation S1:
S1 = f(fBg;cashier;fMaryg); (fBg;cashier;fDorisg);
(fBg;cashier;fAliceg); (fBg;cashier;fKateg);
(fBg;manager;fAliceg); (fBg;auditor;fKateg)g
Credential 6 adds the following instances to relation S2:
S2 = S1 [ f
(fBg;twoCashiers;fMary;Dorisg); (fBg;twoCashiers;fMary;Aliceg);
(fBg;twoCashiers;fMary;Kateg); (fBg;twoCashiers;fDoris;Aliceg);
(fBg;twoCashiers;fDoris;Kateg); (fBg;twoCashiers;fAlice;Kateg)g
Credentials 7 is resolved in S3:
S3 = S2 [ f
(fBg;managerCashiers;fMary;Doris;Aliceg);Deriving RT
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(fBg;managerCashiers;fMary;Aliceg);
(fBg;managerCashiers;fMary;Kate;Aliceg);
(fBg;managerCashiers;fDoris;Aliceg);
(fBg;managerCashiers;fDoris;Kate;Aliceg);
(fBg;managerCashiers;fAlice;Kateg)g;
and credential 8 in S4:
S4 = S3 [ f
(fBg;approval;fMary;Doris;Alice;Kateg);
(fBg;approval;fMary;Alice;Kateg);
(fBg;approval;fDoris;Alice;Kateg)g;
The resulting relation S4 cannot be changed using the given set of credentials, hence: SP = S4.
Because the RT language considered in this example is RTT, there is a set of sets of entities assigned
to each role.
6. Deductive system over RT T credentials
RTT credentials are used to deﬁne roles and roles are used to represent permissions. The semantics
of a given set P of RTT credentials deﬁnes for each role A:r the set of entities which are members
of this role. The member sets of roles can also be calculated in a more convenient way using a
deductive system, which deﬁnes an operational semantics of RTT language.
A deductive system consists of an initial set of formulae that are considered to be true, and
a set of inference rules, that can be used to derive new formulae from the known ones.
Let P be a given set of RTT credentials. The application of inference rules of the deductive
system will create new credentials, derived from credentials of the set P. A derived credential c will
be denoted using a formula:
P  c
which should be read: “credential c can be derived from a set of credentials P”.
Deﬁnition 2. The initial set of formulae of a deductive system over a set P of RTT credentials
are all the formulae:
c 2 P
for each credential c in P. The inference rules of the system are the following:
c 2 P
P  c
(W1)
P  A:r   B:s P  B:s   X
P  A:r   X
(W2)
P  A:r   B:s:t P  B:s   C P  C:t   X
P  A:r   X
(W3)
P  A:r   B:s \ C:t P  B:s   X P  C:t   X
P  A:r   X
(W4)
P  A:r   B:s  C:t P  B:s   X P  C:t   Y
P  A:r   X [ Y
(W5)
P  A:r   B:s 
 C:t P  B:s   X P  C:t   Y X \ Y = 
P  A:r   X [ Y
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There could be a number of deductive sys-
tems deﬁned over a given language. To be use-
ful for practical purposes a deductive system
must exhibit two properties. First, it should
be sound, which means that the inference
rules could derive only formulae that are valid
with respect to the semantics of the language.
Second, it should be complete, which means
that each formula, which is valid according
to the semantics, should be derivable in the
system.
All the credentials, which can be derived in
the system, either belong to set P (rule W1) or
are of the type: P  A:r   X (rules W2 through
W6). To prove the soundness of the deductive
system, one must prove that for each new for-
mula P  A:r   X, the triple (A;r;X) belongs
to the semantics SP of the set P.
Let we ﬁrst note that all the formulae P 
A:r   X , such that A:r   X 2 P are sound.
This is proved in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If A:r   X 2 P then (A;r;X) 2
SP.
Proof. The relation SP, which deﬁnes the seman-
tics of P, is a limit of a monotonically increas-
ing sequence of sets S0;S1 ::: such that S0 = .
According to Deﬁnition 1: f(S0;A:r   X) =
(A;r;X) Hence, (A;r;X) 2 S1 and because
S1  SP then (A;r;X) 2 SP. 
To prove the soundness of the deductive sys-
tem over P, we must prove the soundness of each
formula P  A:r   X, which can be derived
from the set P. This is proved in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. If P  A:r   X then (A;r;X) 2
SP.
Proof. By induction with respect to the number
n of inference steps, which are needed to derive
a formula P  A:r   X.
If n = 1 then the formula P  A:r   X
could be derived only using rule W1, because the
premises of only this rule belong to the initial set
of formulae of the deductive system. Hence, the
thesis is true according to Lemma 1.
Consider n > 1 and assume for the inductive
step that the thesis is true if the number of infer-
ence steps was not greater than n. We will show
that it is true also in a case when the number of
inference steps equals n + 1.
Each of the rules W2 through W6 could be
used in the last (n + 1) step of inference. All
those ﬁve cases are discussed separately.
[W2] The ﬁrst premise of W2 cannot be de-
rived otherwise than using W1. Hence, A:r  
B:s 2 P. The second premise of W2 : P 
B:s   X was derived from P using at most
n steps of inference, hence, (B;s;X) 2 SP ac-
cording to the inductive hypothesis. By Deﬁni-
tion 1, there exists such Si that (B;s;X) 2 Si,
and (A;r;X) 2 f(Si;A:r   B:s) according to
(D2). Because f(Si;A:r   B:s)  Si+1  SP
then (A;r;X) 2 SP.
[W3] The ﬁrst premise of W3 cannot be de-
rived otherwise than using W1. Hence, A:r  
B:s:t 2 P. The second premise of W3 : P 
B:s   C was derived from P using at most
n steps of inference, hence, (B;s;C) 2 SP ac-
cording to the inductive hypothesis. By Deﬁni-
tion 1, there exists such Si that (B;s;C) 2 Si.
Similarly, in the case of the third premise of
W3 : P  C:t   X, there exists such Sj that
(C;t;X) 2 Sj. Let k be the maximum of (i;j).
Then (B;s;C) 2 Sk and (C;t;X) 2 Sk, and
(A;r;X) 2 f(Sk;A:r   B:s:t) according to
(D3). Because f(Sk;A:r   B:s:t)  Sk+1  SP
then (A;r;X) 2 SP.
[W4] The ﬁrst premise of W4 cannot be de-
rived otherwise than using W1. Hence, A:r  
B:s \ C:t 2 P. The second premise of W4 : P 
B:s   X was derived from P using at most
n steps of inference, hence, (B;s;X) 2 SP ac-
cording to the inductive hypothesis. By Deﬁni-
tion 1, there exists such Si that (B;s;X) 2 Si.
Similarly, in the case of the third premise of
W4 : P  C:t   X, there exists such Sj
that (C;t;X) 2 Sj. Let k be the maximum of
(i;j). Then (B;s;X) 2 Sk, (C;t;X) 2 Sk and
(A;r;X) 2 f(Sk;A:r   B:s \ C:t) according to
(D4). Because f(Sk;A:r   B:s\C:t)  Sk+1 
SP then (A;r;X) 2 SP.
[W5] The conclusion of W5 is a formula
P  A:r   X  Y , which states that the set
of entities that can play a role A:r is a union of
two another sets of entities X and Y . To prove
the thesis we must show that (A;r;X[Y ) 2 SP.
The ﬁrst premise of W5 cannot be derived
otherwise than using W1. Hence, A:r   B:s Deriving RT
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C:t 2 P. Similarly as in case of W4, the sec-
ond and the third premises of W5 were derived
from P using at most n steps of inference. So,
(B;s;X) 2 SP and (C;t;Y ) 2 SP. Then, there
exists such k that (B;s;X) 2 Sk and (C;t;Y ) 2
Sk, and (A;r;X [ Y ) 2 f(Sk;A:r   B:s  C:t)
according to (D5). Because f(Sk;A:r   B:s 
C:t)  Sk+1  SP then (A;r;X [ Y ) 2 SP.
[W6] The conclusion of W6 is a formula
P  A:r   X 
 Y , which states that the set
of entities that can play a role A:r is a union of
two another sets of entities X and Y . To prove
the thesis we must show that (A;r;X[Y ) 2 SP.
The ﬁrst premise of W6 cannot be derived
otherwise than using W1. Hence, A:r   B:s 

C:t 2 P. Similarly as in case of W4, the sec-
ond and the third premises of W6 were derived
from P using at most n steps of inference. So,
(B;s;X) 2 SP and (C;t;Y ) 2 SP. Then, there
exists such k that (B;s;X) 2 Sk and (C;t;Y ) 2
Sk. The fourth premise of W6: X \ Y = , does
not depend on the number of inference steps and
is always true if W6 could be applied. Hence,
(A;r;X [Y ) 2 f(Sk;A:r   B:s
C:t)according
to (D6). Because f(Sk;A:r   B:s 
 C:t) 
Sk+1  SP then (A;r;X [ Y ) 2 SP. 
To prove the completeness of the deductive
system over a set P of RTT credentials, we must
prove that a formula P  A:r   X can be
derived using inference rules for each element
(A;r;X) 2 SP. This is proved in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If (A;r;X) 2 SP then P  A:r  
X.
Proof. Assume (A;r;X) 2 SP. By Deﬁnition 1,
there exists such i  0 and such c 2 P that
(A;r;X) 2 f(Si;c). The proof of the thesis is by
induction with respect to the value of index i.
If i = 0 then credential c must take the
form of A:r   X. This is because S0 =  and
f(S0;d) =  for each credential d other than
A:r   X. Hence, A:r   X 2 P and the for-
mula P  A:r   X can be derived using rule
W1.
Let i > 0. Assume for the inductive step that
the thesis is true, if the value of index i in the
expression (A;s;X) 2 f(Si;c) was not greater
than n. We will show that it is true also in the
case when the value of index i equals n + 1.
Assume (A;r;X) 2 SP and (A;r;X) 2
f(Sn+1;c) for a certain c 2 P. The credential
c can take one of the six forms allowed in RTT.
Each of these types of credentials will be dis-
cussed separately.
[c = A:r   X] If this is the case, then the
formula P  A:r   X can be derived using rule
W1.
[c = A:r   B:s] If (A;r;X) 2
f(Sn+1;A:r   B:s), then (B;s;X) 2 Sn+1
according to (D2) of Deﬁnition 1. Hence, there
exists a credential c 2 P such that (B;s;X) 2
f(Sn;c). This implies that (B;s;X) 2 SP
and P  B:s   X according to the induc-
tive hypothesis. Then P  A:r   B:s and
P  B:s   X, hence, P  A:r   X is a
conclusion of rule W2.
[c = A:r   B:s:t] If (A;r;X) 2
f(Sn+1;A:r   B:s:t) then according to (D3)
of Deﬁnition 1, there exists a set of entities C
such that (B;s;C) 2 Sn+1 and (C;t;X) 2 Sn+1.
Hence, there exists a credential c1 2 P such that
(B;s;C) 2 f(Sn;c1) and there exists a creden-
tial c2 2 P such that (C;t;X) 2 f(Sn;c2). This
implies that (B;s;C) 2 SP and (C;t;X) 2 SP,
hence, P  B:s   C and P  C:t   X accord-
ing to the inductive hypothesis. P  A:r   X
is a conclusion of rule W3.
[c = A:r   B:s \ C:t] If (A;r;X) 2
f(Sn+1;A:r   B:s \ C:t) then (B;s;X) 2 Sn+1
and (C;t;X) 2 Sn+1 according to (D4) of Def-
inition 1. Hence, there exist credentials c1;c2
such that (B;s;X) 2 f(Sn;c1) and (C;t;X) 2
f(Sn;c2). This implies that (B;s;X) 2 SP and
(C;t;X) 2 SP, hence, P  B:s   X and P 
C:t   X according to the inductive hypothesis.
P  A:r   X is a conclusion of rule W4.
[c = A:r   B:s  C:t] If (A;r;X) 2
f(Sn+1;A:r   B:s  C:t), then according to
(D5) of Deﬁnition 1, there exist two sets of en-
tities Z;Y such that Z [Y = X and (B;s;Z) 2
Sn+1 and (C;t;Y ) 2 Sn+1. Hence, there exist
credentials c1;c2 such that (B;s;Z) 2 f(Sn;c1)
and (C;t;Y ) 2 f(Sn;c2). This implies that
(B;s;Z) 2 SP and (C;t;Y ) 2 SP, hence, P 
B:s   Z and P  C:t   Y according to the
inductive hypothesis. P  A:r   X is a conclu-
sion of rule W5.18 Anna Felkner, Krzysztof Sacha
[c = A:r   B:s 
 C:t] If (A;s;X) 2
f(Sn+1;A:r   B:s 
 C:t), then according to
(D6) of Deﬁnition 1, there exist two sets of en-
tities Z;Y such that Z [Y = X and Z \Y = 
and (B;s;Z) 2 Sn+1 and (C;t;X) 2 Sn+1.
Hence, there exist credentials c1;c2 such that
(B;s;Z) 2 f(Sn;c1) and (C;t;Y ) 2 f(Sn;c2).
This implies that (B;s;Z) 2 SP and (C;t;Y ) 2
SP, hence, P  B:s   Z and P  C:t   Y ac-
cording to the inductive hypothesis. P  A:r  
X is a conclusion of rule W6. 
A conclusion from Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 is such that the deductive system of Deﬁni-
tion 2 is sound and complete with respect to
the semantics of RTT credentials. This way, the
deductive system gives an operational deﬁnition
of RTT semantics.
7. Conclusions
This paper deals with modelling of trust man-
agement systems in decentralized and dis-
tributed environments. The modelling frame-
work is a family of Role-Based Trust manage-
ment language RTT. Two types of semantics for
a set of RTT credentials have been introduced
in the paper.
A set-theoretic semantics of RTT is deﬁned
as a relation over a set of roles and a power
set (set of sets) of entities. All the members
of a set of entities related to a role must co-
operate in order to satisfy the role. This way,
our deﬁnition covers the full potential of RTT,
which supports the notion of manifold roles and
is able to express structure of threshold and
separation-of-duty policies.
An operational semantics of RTT is deﬁned
as a deductive system, in which credentials can
be derived from an initial set of credentials using
a set of inference rules. The semantics is given
by the set of resulting credentials of the type
A:r   X, which explicitly show a mapping be-
tween roles and sets of entities.
The properties of soundness and complete-
ness of the deductive system with respect to the
semantics of RTT are proved.
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